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INTRODUCTION THIS PAPER ANALYZES a model of a dynamic monopolist who operates in a market
Allowing entry of new consumers changes the character of equilibria in the dynamic monopoly model. For interesting parameter values, the equilibrium specifies that the seller charge a relatively high price in most periods, selling only to buyers with high valuations. Periodically she cuts her price to sell to a large accumulation of buyers with lower valuations. After such a market-clearing sale, the pricing cycle begins again. My main result is that, if players are sufficiently patient, any positive average profit less than the maximum feasible level can be attained in a subgame-perfect equilibrium. I also show that the subset of subgame-perfect equilibria in which players use stationary strategies have the property that when the length of the time period goes to zero, the monopolist seller cannot make sales at prices significantly greater than the lowest willingness to pay. This result agrees with the arguments of Coase (1972) and the analyses of Stokey (1981) , Bulow (1982) , and Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986) who analyze durable-goods monopoly models without entry of new customers.
Ausubel and Deneckere (1989a) prove a folk theorem for the dynamic monopoly problem without entry of consumers. They show that any positive level of average profit less than the static monopoly profit can be achieved in a subgame-perfect equilibrium if players are sufficiently patient, the market demand function satisfies a mild regularity condition, and the lowest buyer valuation is not greater than the seller's (constant marginal) cost or production.2 My result is similar. The assumption that there is a stationary inflow of new consumers replaces the assumption that the marginal cost curve intersects the demand curve. Like Ausubel and Deneckere, I prove the folk theorem by supporting an equilibrium path with a punishment that leads to lower profits. In my treatment in order to approximate the static monopoly average profit the punishment must be more severe than reverting to the stationary equilibrium. The stationary equilibrium profit is not a lower bound for the seller's equilibrium profit. If players are sufficiently patient, then there exist equilibrium outcomes where the seller charges strictly less than the lowest valuation in every period. Bond and Samuelson (1984 and analyze another variation of the dynamic monopoly problem. They assume that the durable good depreciates; they permit resales. The monopolist producer must make replacement sales in order to maintain the stock of the good. Therefore equilibria necessarily involve transactions over infinitely many time periods. Bond and Samuelson (1984) show that the stationary equilibria of their model satisfy a version of the Coase conjecture: As the period length shrinks to zero, the time it takes the seller to supply the competitive quantity approaches zero. Their 1987 paper constructs nonstationary equilibria in which the seller is able to restrict supply to the monopoly profit maximizing level.
Ausubel and Deneckere, Bond and Samuelson, and I identify different models in which the monopolist makes sales over infinitely many time periods. Under these circumstances, nonstationary equilibria exist because behavior at the tail end of the game is not determined. While stationary equilibria of these models exhibit the Coase property, the nonstationary equilibria generally do not. The essential difference between these papers and mine is that by assuming a steady inflow of new consumers and the absence of resales, equilibria in my model involve cyclic variations in price.
Prohibiting resales plays a critical role in my model. If an efficient resale market existed, then the entire stock of the good is on the market at each point. Since consumers with the highest valuations keep the item, the seller need only a sequence of goods and faces a growing market demand. They assume that consumers are uncertain about the seller's constant marginal cost of production, and construct an equilibrium in which the low cost type of seller earns high profits by imitating the strategy of the highest cost type of seller.
keep track of total sales to determine the residual demand. Without resales, the seller must know the number of consumers with each willingness to pay that remain in the market. Since buyers have different tastes, the state of the market in this model is at least two dimensional. Increasing the dimensionality of the state space adds a complication to the analysis not found in the AusubelDeneckere and Bond-Samuelson papers. I describe the model in Section 2. Section 3 discusses stationary equilibria. Stationary equilibria exist in the model. I discuss the effect of shrinking the period length, and show that the number of periods between market-clearing sales is bounded above by a number that does not depend on the period length or the discount factor. Consequently, as the period length shrinks to zero, the length of time between sales also shrinks to zero. This observation proves that the Coase conjecture holds for stationary equilibria in my model. I prove the folk theorem for seller's payoffs in Section 4. In Section 5 I describe the maximum feasible level of average profits. The seller's maximum average profit if she can commit to a selling mechanism is her monopoly profit in the static model. She attains the maximum profit by charging the same price in every period. Section 6 discusses related papers. Conlisk, Gerstner, and Sobel (1984) , henceforth CGS, were the first to study this model. They use a different solution concept, and obtain different results. I explain the differences in Section 7.
THE MODEL
The monopolist faces a uniform group of nonatomic consumers indexed by t > 0 and by j = 1 or 2. Time periods are discrete and indexed by the nonnegative integers. In period n new consumers with indices (t, j) for n < t < n + 1 and j = 1 and 2 enter the market. The measure of an interval (t1, t2) of consumers with j = 1 is a(t2 -t1) and of consumers with j = 2 is (1 -a)(t2 -t1), where a is strictly between zero and one. Each consumer wishes to buy just one unit of the product. Once a consumer buys the product, he leaves the market forever. Resales are forbidden3 and the good does not depreciate. Consumers cannot buy before they enter the market. The utility of a consumer indexed by t and j who buys in period n at the price p is j(Jj -p) provided that n > [t], where
[t] is the greatest integer less than or equal to t. The discount factor : is assumed to be strictly between zero and one. A consumer who never makes a purchase receives utility zero. Vj as the maximum willingness to pay of a consumer indexed by j. I assume that V1 > V2> 0. When a consumer of type (t, j) first enters the market, consumers of type (s, i) for s < t and i = 1 or 2 who have yet to make a purchase are still in the market.4 Consumers differ in at 3 I can justify the no-resales assumption in several ways. First, there is nothing in the model that requires the good to supply a flow of services. Buyers may consume the good completely in the period that they buy it. Second, it may be too costly for an individual to market a single item. Third, buyers may doubt the quality of the good unless it is supported by the monopolist's reputation. most two ways: when they enter the market, and how much they are willing to pay for the item. Two consumers with the same j index have cardinally equivalent preferences once they are both in the market. The monopolist can produce at constant unit cost, assumed without further loss of generality to be zero. The monopolist maximizes the expected present value of revenue; she shares the consumers' discount factor f.
In every period, following the entry of new consumers, the monopolist sets a price. Consumers in the market then decide whether to accept or reject this price. A history at date n is a complete description of what has happened in the past. It includes all past prices and purchase decisions of consumers. The monopolist's strategy specifies a price to charge in each period as a function of the history of the game. A strategy for a consumer specifies whether or not the consumer will accept the monopolist's current price given a history and the current price. I am interested in characterizing the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (henceforth simply equilibria) of this game.
As in Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986), I make a technical assumption that restricts the set of equilibria and makes it easier to describe the equilibria that remain. I assume that the equilibrium actions of each agent are constant on histories in which prices offered are the same and the sets of consumers who accept in each time period differ by at most sets of measure zero. This assumption guarantees that a unilateral deviation by a consumer cannot change the actions of other agents; only the monopolist's unilateral deviations can influence the course of the game. Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986) present an example to show that this assumption does restrict the set of equilibria. Similar examples exist for the model of this paper.
STATIONARY EQUILIBRIA
This section describes the equilibria of the model when each consumer uses a strategy that depends only upon his valuation, the measures of high-and low-valuation consumers in the market when he entered, the measures of highand low-valuation consumers in the market currently (the current state), and the current price of the monopolist. I call these strategies stationary. The stationarity assumption guarantees that consumers do not condition their behavior on prices charged before they entered the market. Stationary equilibria are important for two reasons. First, Theorem 2 shows that equilibria in stationary strategies satisfy the Coase conjecture, which has been the focus of much attention in the literature on dynamic monopoly problems. More importantly, I use properties of stationary equilibria to construct nonstationary equilibria in Section 4.
Denote by (C, c) the state when the measure of high-valuation buyers in the market is aC and the measure of low-valuation buyers in the market is (1 -a)c. When the state of the market is (C, c), I say that the mass of high-(low-) valuation consumers is C (c). The characterization of the stational-y equilibria requires three preliminary results. Lemma 1 states that the price of the monopolist never falls below V2, the willingness to pay of the low-valuation consumers. This result is standard in durable-good monopoly models without entry of consumers (for example, Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986)) and in the formally related bargaining models with one-sided incomplete information (for example, Fudenberg, Levine, and Tirole (1985)). I do not provide a proof of the result; it is essentially identical to the arguments of Fudenberg, Levine, and Tirole (1985) and Gui, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986). The stationarity assumption is necessary for Lemma 1. There exist nonstationary equilibria, described in Section 4, in which the seller charges less than V2 on the equilibrium path.
When the monopolist drops her price to V2 and clears the market, she is said to hold a sale. Lemma 2, stated below, shows that eventually enough low-valuation consumers enter the market to induce the seller to drop the price to V2, at which time all consumers currently in the market purchase the good. In particular, it shows that in every stationary equilibrium there is a sale. It follows that every buyer eventually purchases in a stationary equilibrium.
Stationary equilibria can be characterized by first analyzing equilibria of a game that ends as soon as the seller holds a sale. In these auxiliary games the strategies and preferences of the buyers and the seller are the same as in the original game except that when the seller first holds a sale there is no further entry and the seller receives a value W (discounted from the period after the sale) instead. Since no one will buy at a price greater than V1, equilibrium profit is bounded above by V1/(l -13). It follows from Lemma 1 that the equilibrium profit is an element of [V2/(l -1), V1/(l -1)]. I assume that continuation values to auxiliary games are also in this interval. Lemma 2 states also that these games last a finite number of periods in the sense that in any equilibria of these games there is a bound on the length of time before the seller has a gameending sale.
LEMMA 2: Given P e (0,1), there exists a M* such that, in any stationary equilibrium, after any history, there are never more than M* periods until the next sale. M * also bounds the number of periods until the seller holds a sale in any equilibrium, after any history, of any auxiliary game with continuation value
There is a proof of Lemma 2 in the Appendix. It follows from Lemma 2 that any stationary equilibrium gives rise to an equilibrium to an auxiliary game where the continuation value is equal to the seller's equilibrium discounted profit. Conversely, if W is the discounted profit in an equilibrium to an auxiliary game with continuation value W, then I obtain a stationary equilibrium by repeating the pre-sale portion of the auxiliary game. To characterize stationary equilibria it suffices to do two things: prove the existence of equilibria to auxiliary games with continuation values W> VJ2(l -1), and prove that there exists a W* such that the profit of the equilibrium with the continuation value W* is equal to W*. Benabou (1989) uses similar arguments to construct equilibria in his model. Lemma 3 characterizes equilibria of the auxiliary games.
LEMMA 3: For each WE [VJ2(1 -/), V1/(1 -1)], the auxiliary game determined by W has an equilibrium. In all equilibria of the auxiliary game the seller earns the same profit, which is a continuous function of W. The equilibrium path of prices is uniquely determined by the first price; following the first period, prices on the equilibrium path are deterministic and, when the sale is to occur i periods in the future, the seller charges (1 -1i)Vl + 1 V2. A positive mass of buyers makes purchases in each period. If buyers play the strategy defined in (2), then their aggregate behavior coincides with that described above. The strategy (2) depends only on the mass of low-valuation buyers in the market when the buyer arrived (s), the number of low-valuation buyers that have accumulated since the last sale (c), and the current price (which determines n). S*(C, c; W) gives the optimal responses to the buyers' strategies. If it is single-valued, then the seller charges that price. If it contains more than one element, then the seller chooses a randomization that is determined by the last price charged. A randomization exists that is consistent with the expectation described by P*(.). The behavior of the seller on the equilibrium path is uniquely determined following her choice of initial price. The initial price may be any element of S*(1, 1; W). In subsequent periods (on the equilibrium path) the seller must charge the largest price in S*(.). The monopolist will need to randomize following certain defections (past prices that were not equal to pi for some i).
Existence of stationary equilibria is a consequence of Lemma 3.
THEOREM
1: There exists a stationary equilibrium. In all stationary equilibria, the interval between sales is no greater than M*; following the first period after a sale, prices on the equilibrium path until the next sale are deterministic and, when the sale is to occur i periods in the future, the seller charges (1 -f3)Vl + f3V2. A positive mass of buyers makes purchases in each period. Furthermore, if adV1 < V2, then the stationary equilibrium outcome is unique. In it, the seller charges V2 in each period. If aV1 > V2, then the seller charges prices greater than V2 on the equilibrium path of any stationary equilibrium. Several features of stationary equilibria are of interest. Following the first period after a sale, the equilibrium path generates a determinate sequence of prices. These prices are of the form (1). Low-valuation customers buy at the first sale date after they arrive in the market. They receive no surplus. High-valuation buyers need not buy as soon as they enter the market. Instead, in equilibrium, a fraction of the high-valuation buyers may wait to make a purchase. Although there is no need for buyers to randomize in equilibrium, it is essential to allow different high valuers in the market at the same time to behave differently. These buyers receive the same utility if they buy on any day until the next sale. The seller needs to keep a significant number of high-valuation customers in the market to make the policy of delaying a sale credible. The fewer high-valuation buyers in the market, the more attractive it is to hold a sale. That consumers with the same preferences behave differently is not a novel feature of this model. It appears in the model of Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986) when the market demand curve is a step function; and it appears in the qualitatively similar bargaining model of Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) in the form of randomization by the high-valuation type of buyer.
Theorem 1 also provides conditions when stationary sales cycles are nontrivial. If aV1 > V2, then the seller would prefer to charge a high price rather than a low price if the game lasted for only one period. To see this, observe that in the one-period game the seller has two sensible strategies: she can sell to buyers with high and low valuations, or she can sell only to the high valuers. In the first case, the highest price she can charge is V2, and she earns V2. In the second case, the highest price she can charge is Vl, and she earns aV1. CGS identify this condition. It is also well known that for the durable-goods monopolist problem with no entry and two valuations the monopolist charges more than V2 in equilibrium only if aV1 > V2.
The recent theoretical models of the durable-good monopolist discuss the observation made by Coase (1972) that a monopolist loses her monopoly power if the time between offers shrinks to zero. Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986) establish the result for markets with arbitrary demand curves (satisfying mild regularity conditions) and no entry of new consumers, provided that the minimum consumer valuation is strictly greater than the constant marginal cost of production. Earlier papers by Stokey (1981) and Bulow (1982) establish the result in special cases. A rough intuition for the theorem is that buyers know that the price will fall to the lowest valuation in the market eventually and if the interval between offers is short, then it will not take long for the prices to drop.
When there is no entry of new consumers, any incentive to charge a high price disappears as soon as high valuation buyers leave the market. When new consumers with high valuations enter the market in each period, the seller always has some incentive to charge high prices. This observation suggests that the seller retains some power to extract the surplus of high valuers as the time between offers shrinks to zero. In Section 4, I show that this intuition is correct: There exist equilibria in which the seller extracts monopoly profits from the buyers. Nonstationary strategies are necessary for the result. Theorem 2 below states that the number of periods until the next sale in any stationary equilibrium has an upper bound that does not depend upon the discount factor or the interval between periods. It follows that as the time between periods shrinks to zero, no buyer will need to wait long before the next sale. Therefore, no buyer will be willing to pay much more than V2, the lowest valuation. THEOREM 2: There exists a finite value K that does not depend on the interval between periods or the discount factor such that, after any history leading to a market state (C, c) with C < c,5 the number of periods until the next sale in any stationary equilibrium is bounded above by K.
Unlike the bound M* of Lemma 2, which depends on ,3, K depends only on V1, V2, and a. Hart (1989) shows that there is a finite upper bound to the number of periods before which bargainers will reach agreement with probability one in a two-type model of sequential bargaining. His result applies directly to the durable-good monopoly problem when the market demand function is a step function. 
THE FOLK THEOREM
My main result is that the model of this paper admits multiple, qualitatively different, equilibrium outcomes. Theorem 3 demonstrates that if the players are sufficiently patient, then any positive average profit level less than max {aV1, V2} is attainable in an equilibrium (average profit is 1 -,3 times the present discounted value of profit). In Section 5, I show that this upper bound is the best possible: Using the optimal selling mechanism the seller earns average profit equal to max{aV1, V2}. I describe strategies that support equilibria yielding average profit between E and max{aV1 -e, V2} assuming, without loss of generality, that E is "small" (2e < aV2 is sufficient). I close the section with a comparison of the result to related work and a discussion of how one might select an equilibrium outcome in the model.
Equilibria have a simple path. More complicated strategies are specified off the equilibrium path. I describe first the strategies used on the equilibrium path. Then I describe the punishment equilibria. Throughout this section, I assume aV1 > V2. The strategies below apply only for this case. A slight modification, given in the Appendix, is needed when aV1 < V2. The parameter n depends on /3 and on the profit level of the equilibrium; provided that V e (V2, aV1), it is uniquely determined by (8) and is an increasing function of V. Since n is the number of periods between sales, it should be an integer. I describe the equilibrium assuming that n can take on any positive real value. There are several ways to avoid the integer problem. For example, one could specify that equilibrium cycles alternate in length between the integer values closest to the solution of (8). Properly chosen, these cycles would lead to profit that is arbitrarily close to V/(1 -,3).6
If the seller is to attain average profit greater than V2, then there should be a long interval between sales. If the length of time between sales is n, and f3n converges to one, then the prices given by (1) are not significantly greater than V2. Cycles are not long enough to generate average profit greater than V2. Since lim 3.1 /3fn = limo 1 e-( -? n the asymptotic properties of (1 -,B)n determine those of /3n. It is straightforward to show that if (8) defines n, then limo 1(1 -f)n exists and (9) lim (1 -,3) n = L where (eL -1)/L = (aV1 -V2)/(aV1 -V), so n increases at a rate proportional to 1/(1 -1). (9) implies that /3n converges 6Alternatively, one could allow public correlation, which would make it possible to attain any equilibrium value in the convex hull of the values attainable through cycles of integer length. Or one could pick the least integer greater than the value of n that solves (8) and lower the prices on the equilibrium path to make the seller's profit equal to V/(1 -,3). to something strictly less than one; the greater is V, the smaller is the limit. The result is intuitive because in order to approximate average profit of aV1, high-valuation buyers must be induced to pay V1; they will do so only if the discounted surplus available to a high valuer who waits for a sale, which is at least 8f3(Vl -V2), converges to zero.
If the seller deviates from the equilibrium path, then a punishment begins. The nature of the punishment depends on how many buyers are in the market at the time of a deviation; punishment strategies are independent of V, the average profit generated on the equilibrium path. Let G(C, c) = Ca + c(l -a) be the measure of consumers when (C, c) is the state of the market. A deviation triggers a qualitatively different punishment depending on whether G(C, c) is greater than or less than m, where m is a number determined by ,3 (but independent of V). I define m precisely below. For now it is enough to know that m is so large (relative to /3) that limo 1 fl3 = 0 or, equivalently, (10) lim(1-/3)m=oo. To get an idea of why the stationary equilibrium is not a severe enough punishment, argue as follows. The attraction of cutting prices in the middle of a cycle is that the seller can move forward the revenue she obtains from the accumulated low-valuation consumers; if, as in the stationary equilibrium, everyone in the market buys when the seller charges V2, then the gain from selling in the middle of a cycle (when there are, say, (1 -a)n accumulated periods of low-valuation buyers from a E (0, 1)) is approximately (1 -a)(1 -,l3an)(1 -a)nV2 because the seller earns V2 from the accumulated (1 -a)(1 -a)n measure of low valuers in the current period rather than earning V2 in periods in the future. On the other hand, after the market clears the seller earns an average profit of approximately V2 in the stationary equilibrium, while the average profit on the equilibrium path can be no larger than aV1. Consequently, a deviation is attractive if (1 -a)(1 -/3an)(1 -a)nV2 > (aV1 -V2)7(1 -,3), which, by (9), will hold if V is close to aV1.
Since reverting to the stationary equilibrium in the event of a deviation cannot support a high-profit outcome, a harsher punishment is needed when G(C, c) < m at the time of a deviation. The punishments are qualitatively similar to the two-stage punishments used by Abreu (1986) (see also Abreu (1989) and Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) for related approaches) to study equilibria in repeated games with discounting. The first stage of the punishment is severe. The second stage is a reward for participating in the first stage. The first phase of the punishment in the equilibria that I construct takes place in the period that the deviation occurs. The equilibrium specifies that the seller charge a low price, denoted by g (C, c) ; everyone in the market buys at this price. This phase of the punishment lasts for only one period. The second phase of the punishment is a reward that involves following a path, selected from the class of candidate equilibria described above, for the remainder of the game. The second-phase equilibrium yields profit V(C, C).7 The equilibrium specifies a different punishment depending on the state of the market when a deviation took place. There is only one punishment equilibrium in Abreu's work. The reason for the difference is that the game studied here is not a simple repeated game. Only the seller is an active player in every period. The game repeats after a market clearing sale, but sales occur at endogenously determined intervals. Most important, there is a qualitatively different subgame for each market state (C, c), and there are an infinite number of potential states.
I give explicit formulas for g(*) and v(*) below. First, I give an explanation of why the punishments depend nontrivially on the state of the market. Imagine strategies which specify that in the event of a deviation, the seller punishes herself by charging a low price p < V2, independent of the market state at the time of the deviation. Buyers would then never expect the price to fall below p, and the seller could induce everyone in the market to buy at any price less than ,8p + (1 -, )V2. As a result, the seller prefers to charge prices slightly higher than p rather than to follow the equilibrium. The same reasoning suggests that g( ) must increase to encourage the seller to participate in her own punishment. The function that I use actually increases without bound. No buyer will purchase at a price greater than his valuation, so the seller will not be able to clear the market when the market state (C, c) is large. That is why I use the stationary equilibrium as a punishment when G(C, c) > m. g( ) can, however, be made arbitrarily small for all states (C, c) such that G(C, c) < n. Formally, there exists /3* E (0, 1) such that for all , E (,3*, 1) and the n corresponding to ,l given by (8), be possible to support an equilibrium in which the seller earned average profit e; instead, the seller would prefer to deviate in the very first period and receive a punishment that is better than the equilibrium itself. In fact, I require that there exists /3* E (0, 1) such that for all l3 E (,3*, 1), (12) if G(C,c) <n, then v(C,c)=e/(1-/3).
Recall that on the equilibrium path, G(C, c) < n. Provided that (11) holds, so that g(C, c) is less than E on the equilibrium path, (12) guarantees that the seller has no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium path. In view of (12) guarantees that the second effect encourages the seller to follow the equilibrium. The first effect may allow the seller to earn more from the sellers currently in the market than the equilibrium, but it is always dominated by the second effect. Lemma 6, which is stated and proved in the Appendix, gives a formal proof. Here is an intuition. If the seller is expected to charge g(D, d) in the next period, then no one will buy at prices greater than (1 -/)Vl + /3g(D, d) in the current period. These prices cannot be much greater than g(C, c), particularly when the market is crowded (due to the concavity of g( )), so the deviation is not profitable enough to compensate for the decrease in payoff caused by delaying the reward. PROOF OF THEOREM 3: I have already argued that the profit generated by the equilibrium path is what I claim it to be. Lemmas 5 and 6 establish that the seller's strategy responds optimally to the buyers' strategies specified for the punishment portion of the equilibrium. I show below that it is never advantageous for the seller to deviate from the equilibrium path and that the buyers respond optimally to the seller's strategy.
I give a sketch following the definition of v( ). Let v(C, c) = (1 -,3)-max{e, g(C, c) + (U-V2)(G(C, c) -m')/(m + 1 -m')}, which, since g(C, c) < E if and only if G(C, c) < m', implies that
I first show that the seller responds optimally to the buyers' equilibrium strategies if she follows the equilibrium path. There are two cases, depending on whether or not the average profit on the equilibrium path is greater than V2. In order for the seller to prefer to follow the equilibrium path rather than defect when average profit exceeds V2, it must be the case that, for c < n, k(n, c) is greater than or equal to the profit that the seller would receive from a defection. If the seller chooses to deviate from the equilibrium path, then the best she can do is charge g(1, c) because as soon as the seller deviates from the equilibrium path, the punishment portion begins, and the optimal behavior for the seller when G(C, c) < m (which it must be following the first deviation since on the equilibrium path G(C, c) < G(1, n) < n and n < m) is to charge g(C, c) as specified by the punishment equilibrium. Her profit is bounded above by ( 
19) g(l, c)G(l, C) + pv(1, C) < [(1 -B)Vlnl+"7] (-q) + pv(1, c).
On the other hand, since on the path of the equilibrium that yields average profit greater than V2 the seller charges at least V2 in every period, and high valuation buyers purchase as soon as they enter,
(1-/3)4(n,c) > aV2.
Since, by (9), lim 8 1(1 -f)2n 1 q = 0, and by (12) (21) implies that the seller prefers to follow the equilibrium path than to defect. When V A V2, the state of the market on the equilibrium path is always (C, c) = (1, 1) . The most the seller can earn if she deviates from the equilibrium path is (22) g(1, 1) +,13v(1, 1), which she earns if she charges g(1, 1). Since g(1, 1) < E when /3 is close enough to one, (12) implies that (22) is bounded above by E + /(1 -3) = s/(1 -/), which is less than or equal to the V/(1 -E/) that the seller earns when she follows the equilibrium. I need to check that the buyers behave optimally when they follow the specified strategies on the equilibrium path. High valuers obtain the same surplus from buying any day until the next time the seller cuts her price to V2. They respond optimally when they buy in the period that they enter the market. Low valuers also respond optimally when they buy at the first sale after entering the market.
It is optimal for a buyer to purchase whenever the seller charges p = g(C, c) and the state of the market (C, c) satisfies G(C, c) < m + 1. To see this, note that after the seller charges g(C, c), the equilibrium specifies that she charge Bond and Samuelson's (1984 and 1987) models of replacement sales have similar properties. As the period length shrinks to zero, the stationary equilibrium outcome converges to the competitive one. Because the monopolist is always producing to meet the demand for replacement goods, there also exist nonstationary equilibria in which the seller makes monopoly profits.
There are also equilibria that are worse for the seller than the stationary equilibrium: If the discount factor is close to one, then there exist equilibria in 8 Gul and Sonnenschein (1988) , in the related context of alternating offer bargaining with one-sided uncertainty and common knowledge of gains from trade, show that the length of time needed to reach an agreement in stationary equilibria shrinks to zero as the period length shrinks to zero. 9 The connection between stationary equilibria and the Coase property should not be taken too far. Ausubel and Deneckere (1988a and 1988b) analyze the set of stationary equilibria in infinitehorizon bargaining games with two-sided incomplete information. They show that the set of stationary equilibrium outcomes is large. It includes efficient outcomes. They also show that when there is two-sided incomplete information stationary equilibria need not satisfy the Coase property. which the seller earns an arbitrarily small amount in every period. It is therefore misleading to say that the seller loses all monopoly power in stationary equilibria. The seller makes even less in other equilibria.
The equilibrium paths I construct are stationary. If the seller's average profit is less than V2, then each period she charges the same price. If the seller's average profit is greater than V2, then she follows the cyclic pricing pattern (1). In both cases, the behavior of the players on the equilibrium path depends only on the market state. Also, in contrast to the stationary equilibrium, there is never a cumulation of high valuers on the equilibrium path nor does the seller randomize.
The seller charges strictly positive prices in the equilibria I consider. There exist equilibria in which the seller periodically pays customers to buy her product in order to earn a reward for doing so in the future. Allowing the seller to charge negative prices does not expand her set of equilibrium payoffs.
The existence of multiple equilibria that have different payoffs for the monopolist may be counterintuitive. One might expect that if the seller really has market power, then she would be able to influence the market enough to select the most profitable equilibrium. In practice the seller may have this power. Several arguments could be used to select an equilibrium in my model. I mention some possibilities below. The discussion is only suggestive; I have no results that select a unique equilibrium.
If the buyers learn about the behavior of the seller by studying prices she has charged in the past, then it may be in the seller's interest to follow the path that leads to high profits in order to convince future entrants that sales occur infrequently. In a different context, Laffont and Maskin (1987) show that a monopolist can induce naive buyers, who use the monopolist's past behavior to forecast her future behavior, to have beliefs consistent with her most profitable equilibrium.
A different approach to equilibrium selection is the reputation model of Fudenberg and Levine (1989) in which a long-lived player is able to approximate the payoff of a player able to commit to an action in each stage game if her short-lived opponents are uncertain about her preferences.10 For the equilibria that I have discussed, the monopolist is the only player that remains active for more than a finite number of periods. It would be natural to assume that buyers are uncertain about the state of the market, the seller's cost of production, or the ability of the seller to commit to a policy of never holding a sale.
Still another approach to equilibrium selection is the idea of "money burning" introduced by Ben-Porath and Dekel (1988) and van Damme (1989). These papers provide conditions under which one player's most preferred outcome is the unique equilibrium of an auxiliary game where that player can publicly burn money prior to the play of the original game. Noninformative advertising may play the role of money burning in the dynamic monopoly problem. It seems natural to assume that the monopolist is the only player in the game who has access to a money-burning technology.
THE PROFIT-MAXIMIZING MECHANISM
In this section I determine the seller's maximal earnings if she were able to commit to an arbitrary selling strategy. A simple way to think about commitment power is to imagine that the seller is a Stackelberg leader in the game. She chooses a strategy that maximizes her discounted profits assuming that the buyers respond optimally. The announced policy need not be an optimal response to the buyers' behavior. For example, the seller could announce that she will charge a price slightly less than V1 in every period; high valuers can do no better than purchase in the period they enter, so the seller earns aVI/(1 -,/). When aV1 > V2, this policy is more profitable than the stationary equilibrium."1 In this section I show that there is no selling strategy available to the seller that allows her to earn more than she would if she was committed to charging a constant price in every period. When aV1 > V2, the profit maximizing constant price is V1; when V2 > a V1, the profit maximizing price is V2. This result shows that the upper bound to the seller's profit in noncooperative equilibrium given in Theorem 3 is the best possible.
In order to find the maximum profit available to the seller, I need to describe feasible selling mechanisms. In a direct selling mechanism the seller chooses functions r(t, j) and q(t, j) for t > 0 and j = 1 or 2. Each buyer reports a type (s, k) to the seller. He is able to report any valuation, k = 1 or 2, and any date of entry later than his actual arrival time, s > [t]. A buyer who reports (s, k) pays r(s, k) (in period zero dollars) and obtains the item with discounted probability q(s, k) (that is, if the buyer receives the item with probability Qn in period n, then q(s, k) = E:013BQ,). The mechanism must satisfy, for j, k = 1 and 2, and t > 0: (24), and (25). Although there are selling mechanisms in which buyers report an element from an arbitrary set of messages rather than choosing an element directly from the set of indices, the revelation principle implies that the seller does not gain from using them.12 The formulation does depend on the assumption that all buyers and the seller share a common discount factor. This assumption guarantees that the discounted value of payments, r(*), is the same for all players. Specifically, assume that the buyers all have the discount factor /3, but the seller uses the discount factor y #3,8. If a buyer who reported (s, k) could purchase the item by paying p(t; s, k) in period t for t = 0, 1,2,..., then the buyer's discounted price is E',o/3tp(t; s, k), which is not necessarily equal to the seller's valuation of the stream of payments, E"0=o0ytp(t; s, k). The seller can take advantage of the difference in time preferences and earn profit by borrowing and lending even if she did not sell anything.
Theorem 4 describes what the monopolist could earn using a selling mechanism. If there was no entry of new consumers and the seller could set a single take-it-or-leave-it price, then she would charge either V2 and sell to everyone, or V1 and sell only to the high valuers. The theorem states the seller can do no better than repeat her best one-shot strategy even when there is entry of new consumers and more elaborate selling strategies are feasible. The seller implements the optimal selling strategy by promising to charge the same price (either V1 or V2) in every period.
Theorem 4 is reminiscent of Stokey's (1979) result that a monopolist in a multiperiod market without entry of new consumers can do no better than commit to the single static monopoly price if she discounts at the same rate as the buyers. In a bargaining model formally analogous to the monopoly problem, Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) show that a take-it-or-leave-it offer is the optimal bargaining mechanism.
CGS show that if the seller charges prices of the form (1) and high valuers buy in the period that they enter the market, then profits are monotonically increasing (decreasing) in the interval between sales if aV1 > V2 (aV1 < V2). Coles (1989) obtains a similar result.
If the seller commits to the strategy of charging V1 in every period, then eventually she must resist the temptation to sell to an enormous backlog of low valuers. The rationality of high valuers makes it profitable ex ante for the seller to try to keep the price high; if the buyers expect the price to fall in the future, then they will not pay V1 when they enter the market. The monopolist in Benabou's (1989) paper faces a cost of adjusting its nominal price in an inflationary economy. The good produced lasts for two periods. In the Markov-perfect equilibrium the seller typically uses a mixed strategy to determine when to increase her nominal price. Some consumers speculate on the timing of price adjustments; they buy in large quantities for future resale when they expect the price to increase. While Benabou concentrates on different issues, the price dynamics of his model have several features in common with mine. In particular, real prices decline in most periods, but periodically they rise sharply. On average demand is higher just before the price rises. Benabou's price dynamics are typically stochastic; mine are deterministic.
COMPARISON WITH CGS
CGS analyze the model of this paper but they obtain different results. In this section I briefly review how CGS characterize their equilibrium and explain how it differs from the subgame-perfect equilibria that I discuss.
CGS do not specify complete strategies for the players of the game. They reduce the problem to one where the seller selects the length of a sale cycle. The seller picks a sale date, and charges prices of the form (1). High-valuation buyers purchase as soon as they enter the market, and low-valuation buyers 13 Kyle Bagwell and Garey Ramey and Gene Grossman and Michael Katz also have suggested this model. purchase at the first sale date after they enter the market. A dynamic choice problem determines the length of the equilibrium sale cycle. Each period the seller may either have a sale or wait. If she has a sale, then all future sales cycles occur at the same interval. If she waits, then in the next period she must again decide whether or not to have a sale. CGS show that if the seller goes long enough without having a sale, then she cannot resist holding one. From that date they use backward induction to determine the equilibrium cycle length.
CGS assume that high-valuation buyers purchase immediately if they do not lose surplus by doing so. Therefore there will never be a backlog of high valuers in equilibrium. They also assume that the timing of the first sale influences expectations about the timing of future sales. Hence the seller maintains an incentive to keep her price high even when the interval between periods is short. By delaying a sale the seller convinces future entrants that future cycles will be long. This effect does not enter into computations when new consumers do not come into the market or, as in the stationary equilibria of this paper, pricing behavior prior to a sale does not influence equilibrium behavior after the market clears. It is precisely this kind of consideration that allows me to construct nonstationary equilibria where the seller charges prices significantly greater than V2 even when the interval between offers is arbitrarily small. ) verification is similar. El defines the highest price that any buyer will pay if there will be a sale in the next k + 1 periods. Buying at Pk+1 in the current period yields the same utility to a high buyer as waiting k more periods for a sale. E2 states that the optimal price for the seller must be of the form (1 -, p)V1 +, pV2 for i < k. E3 describes the aggregate response of the buyers to the seller's strategy. E4 states that the seller's optimal price does not decrease when the mass of high valuers in the market increases. E5 gives a condition that insures that the artificial constraint on the timing of sales does not bind. E6 implies that if the seller charges Pk, then she sells to as many high valuers as possible consistent with Pk -being optimal in the next period. E7 implies that relaxing the constraint on the time of the next sale does not lower the optimal prices of the seller. E8 is equivalent to requiring that the high valuer be indifferent between buying at p and waiting. E9 guarantees that there are positive purchases in each period. E10 insures that the equilibrium profit function of the auxiliary game is continuous in W.
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Since there is a bound M* on the number of periods until the next sale in all subgames of a stationary equilibrium, the seller does not charge more than PM*+1 in equilibrium. Therefore, E5 guarantees that Vk(*), Sk(*), Dk(*), Bk(*), and Pk(-) do not change when k > M* + 1; denote the limiting values by 7r*(-), S*(.), D*(-), B*(-), and P*( ). I describe in the text the correspondence between these mappings and equilibria to the auxiliary game. g(C, c) . The first term in (A17) is the profit from selling immediately to all high valuers currently in the market at the highest price they would accept, the second term is the profit from selling immediately to the low valuers currently in the market at the highest price that they would accept, and w is the profit of the seller in the stationary equilibrium after the market has been cleared. After clearing the market, the seller could earn no more in a stationary equilibrium (when alV > V2) than she would if she sold to all high valuers as soon as they enter the market at the price PK and sold to low valuers as soon as they enter the market at the price V2. Consequently, 
